How the Turkish left can defeat Erdoğan

Photography by Efe Aydog

Efe Aydoğ argues for a united leftist agenda to address the current socioeconomic issues in Turkey.

Turkey finds itself in search of new political dynamics following the recent currency crisis. On top of the crisis, income inequality is the fifth highest in the OECD, unemployment rates have reached 14%, and the minimum monthly wage of 2020 liras is well below the poverty line of 6790 liras. As masses unsatisfied with President Erdoğan’s agenda have started to lose faith, the AKP has lost five out of the six largest cities in the 2019 municipal elections. The desire for change is reflected in opinion polls, with support for the AKP slipping to as low as 32%, and an opposition candidate coming in first for the first time since 2002.

Yet the opposition sends mixed signals to the electorate. The Mayor of İstanbul is regarded as a stepping stone to the presidency, and the newly elected Ekrem İmamoğlu so far seems to be the favourable opposition candidate for the 2023 elections. A candidate of alliance between the centre-right İyi Party and centre-left CHP, the pillars of İmamoğlu’s success were promises to promote social welfare in the city, and his de-facto alliance with the Kurdish party (HDP) that gave people hope for more social inclusion. But if Mr. İmamoğlu aspires to challenge President Erdoğan in the next election, he needs to further develop this rhetoric. As the AKP drifts further right thanks to their coalition with the ultra-nationalist MHP, a united left with a proper agenda, rather than the fragile alliance between the centre-left and centre-right, is necessary to address the current socioeconomic issues in Turkey.

Although it is difficult to argue that the left in Turkey has ever been united, the ’70s marked a definite golden age of the Turkish left with the power of workers’ unions, a collective consciousness, and the coming-to-power of centre-left governments. Politicians and constituents in this era were energised by the motives of the revolutionary ’68 generation. These glory days came to an end with the 1980 coup d’état and the subsequent brutal two-year rule of a junta, with hundreds of thousands detained and hundreds killed in state prisons. Adding to the triumph of a neoliberal consensus, both in Turkey and abroad, the left in Turkey found itself discouraged and unpopular, with a cumulative vote share of no more than a third throughout the elections in the ’80s and ’90s.

Ever since the 2002 election, which led to a two-party parliament, Turkish leftists have arguably split into three factions. The first is the main opposition, CHP, stuck in a Blair-like centrist consensus that has led to lower income voters becoming disillusioned with the party. The second is the HDP, who, after seeing their leader Selahattin Demirtas detained in 2017 and almost half of their mayors removed from office, have made the Kurdish issue primary on their agenda. The HDP has failed to sever connections to the PKK, losing their popularity with the majority of non-Kurdish voters. The third faction consists of other smaller leftist parties and organisations such as the Communist Party and the ÖDP who fail to mobilise masses with their arguments. 

But I would argue the solution for Turkish politics still lies within the left. With changes in attitude across the CHP, the HDP and other smaller parties, desperate masses struck by the economic crisis can find hope in the Turkish left. 

As the main opposition, the CHP needs a clear leftist economic agenda with bold proposals that could ignite some sort of a “Turkish New Deal.” There should be more focus on how the economic crisis affects the daily lives of citizens, instead of criticising every move made by the ruling party. Plausible policy proposals need to be integrated into the party’s new economic thesis, to bring an end to the classic pro or counter Erdoğan paradigm that has reigned for almost two decades. Inspiration can be taken from Ecevit’s manifesto from the ’60s, “The Left of the Centre”, or the way Corbyn’s Labour has challenged the Blairite status quo in the British left. In the US, inspiration can be found in Bernie Sanders' campaign for the 2016 Democratic nomination that pushed the party to the left, and is continuing in the run-up to the 2020 election.

The “Centre Turkey” project proposing the construction of a mega city in Central Anatolia by the CHP during their 2015 election campaign was criticised by many for being too unrealistic. Yet it was also praised for being one of the first propositions by the opposition to counter the relatively successful infrastructure developments during the early AKP government. The opposition should emphasise the shortcomings of central government projects, propose feasible alternative solutions based on local needs, and reverse the privatisation of infrastructure projects. 

Simultaneously, the HDP must disassociate itself from the PKK and the attacks on the Turkish army and civilians to build post-conflict trust with the general electorate. Before being imprisoned, Selahattin Demirtaş led several successful campaigns which saw a Kurdish party surpass the 10% threshold for the first time in history. He openly condemned the PKK for their attacks and called them to drop weapons for negotiations. By doing so, the HDP can continue to be the party for those that consider themselves further to the left than the CHP but also oppose the PKK. 

Smaller parties can then look forward to alliances with the CHP and HDP to overcome the 10% electoral threshold. The TİP ran their candidates within the HDP in the 2018 general elections and saw two MPs gain seats for the first time after seeing 15 MPs beaten up and kicked out of parliament in 1968. Similarly, the Communist Party’s success in 2014 and 2019 Ovacık local elections lead to a meteoric increase in the popularity of Mayor Maçoğlu and his leftist policies. The town has so far been a successful communist experiment in one of the poorest regions of Turkey, and models that resemble Ostrom’s common-pool resources could help mobilise voters in underdeveloped Anatolian rural regions. 

Finally, an environmental agenda is necessary for the left to succeed at a local level. The environmentally disastrous “Build-Operate-Transfer” economic model allows Erdoğan’s investor allies to receive construction bids with ease, as 5 of the top 10 private firms to receive government projects in the world are Turkish. The construction of unregulated power plants in fertile Turkish land, which accounts for more than half of the world’s fig and hazelnut production, has caused public outrage. More voters can be reached by uniting local ecological activists. For instance, those in the Black Sea region campaigning against hydroelectric dams, and those in the Aegean region protesting geothermal power plants. If mobilised successfully, masses can be attracted to a potential leftist coalition as the climate crisis worsens.

The left in Turkey remains divided and weak due to its lack of significant structural change. Despite its fragility, the alliance against Erdoğan with the centre-right will be valuable in reshaping Turkish politics in a post-Erdoğan era. However, the current socioeconomic conditions raise an opportunity for the Turkish left to reignite the spirit of the ’70s. It is perhaps the greatest opportunity in the last two decades for members and leaders of the CHP, HDP, and other leftist political organisations to successfully mobilise the population and defeat Erdoğan at the ballot box.

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This article was amended on 10th December 2019.