Japan's One-Party Democracy
Flag of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
Japan is one of East Asia’s oldest democracies. It has had democratic forms of government as early as 1912 during the Taisho period, albeit in a very preliminary form. Today, Japan’s democracy index is extremely high, having a higher rating than the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.
However, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has maintained a near monopoly on power since shortly after a democratic parliamentary system was officially installed by the United States during its occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. Despite maintaining incredibly low approval ratings, the LDP has been the dominant political party since 1955 with the exception of brief periods from 1993-1996 and 2009-2012. How have they managed to maintain such a tight grip on power? And what are the implications of one-party dominance for Japan’s democracy?
Japan’s centralised fiscal system contains an important central-local government dynamic: only about 30% of local governments’ revenue is collected through local taxes, with the rest being accounted for through a system of tax allocation transfers managed directly by the central government. These tax transfers account for the “need-based” funding of local districts, and are distributed through a series of apolitical criteria.
However, the recipients of additional government disbursements and subsidies are determined at the discretion of the central government, enabling the LDP to advance its own political agenda through clientelist networks. A significant consequence of these clientelist policies is that LDP politicians become the only “quality candidates”. That is, politicians capable of building a reputation for having strong connections with the central government, which allows them to channel additional resources to the local level. This further entrenches the LDP’s monopoly on power as incumbent politicians are able to manipulate resources to mobilise political support for the party.
Japanese citizens are well aware of the rules of the game. Indeed, they are much more likely to cite LDP politicians as capable of bringing in additional funding, and Japanese media outlets have exposed LDP politicians numerous times for suggesting that non-LDP prefectures should have their funds cut. Political scientist Ethan Scheiner mapped out the relationship between local district fiscal autonomy and the success rate of opposition parties in local elections, finding a strong positive correlation between the two. The results were clear: the lower the reliance on LDP-controlled subsidies, the fewer votes they received. This has led academic researchers to conclude that “Japanese voters are mobilised at election time mainly by the lure of pork barrel, only marginally by policy issues, and even less by ideals and visions.”
What does this mean for Japanese democracy?
The answer is that the Japanese have become increasingly weary of incumbent authorities and political institutions. Recent polls reflect that only four in ten Japanese people are satisfied with the way democracy functions in their country, while two thirds of the population believes that things do not change regardless of who wins an election.
As a result, voter turnout has steadily decreased, going from 69.3% in 2009 to 52.05% in 2022, placing it in the lowest quartile for voter turnout in the world. But belief in democratic values hasn’t waned.
Indeed, the 2016 Asian Barometer Survey revealed that 95% of the Japanese public agrees with the statement that while democracy may have its problems, it remains the best form of government. Instead, disillusionment remains targeted at the institutions that govern, and increasingly with the system through which democratic values are implemented. And while 77% agree that a system in which democratically elected representatives decide what becomes law is good, 65% also believe that citizens should be able to vote on major national policies to decide what becomes law.
The dangers of not dealing with a growing mistrust of political institutions are that this may eventually come to undermine people’s faith in democratic values altogether. This is especially dangerous when it comes to generational value change, which is extremely difficult to reverse once it has been incorporated into the political culture of a new generation. While young people in Japan continue to predominantly express a favourable view of democracy, they are also the most critical of Japanese politicians and institutions. The threat of right-wing populist politics is also ever-present, especially in current times of economic hardship and an increasingly closed-off national sentiment triggered by the pandemic.
If Japan wishes to deal with these issues, significant changes to their political system may be in order. From decentralisation of fiscal spending and more direct forms of democracy to higher female representation in the political arena, the areas for improvement are many and will require deep systemic change. Japanese politicians must address these issues if they wish to preserve support for democratic values and prevent right-wing populism from gaining ground. The Taisho period witnessed an era of political turmoil which laid the foundations for democratic governance in Japan. A little more than a century later, a similar political transformation may be needed.