Has Trump Done Starmer a Lasting Favour?

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Just weeks ago, the momentum enjoyed by populist parties across the west seemed unstoppable. In Germany’s recent federal elections, the AfD doubled their vote-share to 20.8%, compared to 10.4% in 2021. In September of last year, Austria’s populist party, the FPÖ, won a larger proportion of votes (28.8%) than any other party. Reform UK, who won 14.3% of the popular vote (but only five seats) in the 2024 GE, now leads in voting intention polls. Most European countries now seem to be run by precarious coalitions whose only substantive point of agreement is keeping the far-right out of power.  

Trump’s efforts to fashion a new world-order have dampened this momentum somewhat as people across Europe struggle to digest the language of unalloyed self-interest now barefacedly spoken by the United States. It was easy to opine for a leader that ‘says it like it is’ when the people in power so deftly concealed the realpolitik that governs statecraft from the world. Now, they have their wish. Trump, Hegseth, and Rubio certainly aren’t mincing words: Gaza is to become a resort, Ukraine is to cough up $500bn in minerals in return for prior American support, Europe is to go it alone. Many who were sympathetic to the populist cause prior to Trump’s election are probably thinking twice now that he’s in power.   

The beleaguered European ancien régime, who now cling to power only by their fingertips, will be quick to exploit the anxiety and indecision facing European populists as the latter come to terms with the reality of no longer being a marginal political force on the world stage. What, after all, do they really want? Do they trust themselves enough to assume the burden of writing the future? Confidence in one’s vision comes easily to populist Americans whose still unrivalled economic and military power shelters them from the indignity of being proven wrong. Indeed, notions of right and wrong are entirely absent from the naturalist, extra-moral order that Trump is heralding. Nigel Farage, on the other hand, as he makes a futile attempt to play both sides of the widening Atlantic, seems to have too delicate a stomach for the new world of which he supposedly is a part. He, unlike Trump, will not be able to hide from his mistakes: The explosion of infighting amongst Reform MPs highlights their growing vulnerability. Starmer, Merz, and Macron, by contrast, get to have their Churchill moment, basking in moral authority for the first time in a long time. For now, at least, cultural and political momentum seems to have shifted. 

Hawkish rhetoric, like Starmer’s plans to increase defence spending and put British boots on the ground in Ukraine, has momentarily mollified domestic opposition by creating a sense of unity in the face of a common enemy. However, once rhetoric becomes policy and the true costs of putting the economy on a soft war-footing come into view, divisions will likely re-appear with renewed energy. 

It’s not obvious how much money is required to re-arm, but Starmer’s proposed increase in defence spending to 2.7% of GDP by 2027, from 2.3% in 2024, which is being funded by cutting overseas aid, is clearly not sufficient to achieve “war-readiness”. For example, according to the Telegraph, “Kevin Craven, chief executive of ADS group, the defence trade association, welcomed the pledge but warned it stopped short of meeting levels required for “wartime” production”, and Professor Trevor Taylor of the Royal United Services Institute said that the defence industry “would greet the spending pledges with “relief” but warned that further rises would be needed”.  

Britain, unlike Germany, cannot issue more debt to pay for more defence spending. The chancellor’s self-imposed borrowing limits have long since been wiped out by weak growth and high-borrowing costs, as public sector net debt reaches 95% of GDP. 

The Chancellor is therefore expected to use a combination of “several billions” of welfare cuts and “stealth” tax rises in the spring statement later this month to raise money. However, persistently weak growth, inflation, and rising health and disability benefits bills, amongst other things, may eat through a significant amount of this money before much can be spent on Defence. Deeper welfare cuts will therefore likely be necessary for Starmer to unlock the money that he is looking for. The fact that a rebellion amongst Labour backbenchers is reportedly brewing in response to expected welfare cuts demonstrates there is by no means consensus support for such a policy. This rift has plenty of room to expand once cuts and tax rises make the trade-off between “guns and butter” felt.  

Whilst Starmer’s response to America’s U-turn on its policy in Europe and Ukraine has weakened confidence amongst populists and prompted a jump in his approval ratings, Starmer will have a tough time preserving this momentum as the scale of the task of rearmament presents itself. If he shies from meeting the task that he has set for himself, he loses his newfound direction; if he pursues it, unpopular welfare cuts may alienate both a sizeable proportion of the electorate and the left of his party, while tax-rises will dampen enthusiasm for rearmament on the right. Trump is unlikely to have done Starmer a lasting favour.