Shaping Votes, Not Values: Behind Orbán’s Ban on Pride
Photo Courtesy: Attila Kisbenedek via AFP
Hungary often appears controversially in international news, yet Viktor Orbán’s ban of Pride came as a shock regardless. The modification of the Assembly Act came into effect last week, eliminating any assembly that violates the child protection law (CPL). The CPL legislates against the exposure of LGBTQ+ content to under 18s. The passing of last week’s bill is the latest impairment to targeted community rights.
The bill was passed on Tuesday amidst smoke bombs launched in protest by rival politicians, perhaps in vain given Fidesz enjoys a two-thirds majority in parliament. The ban of Pride stems from the amendment of the CPL in July 2021. According to the latest version, no content is allowed which shows ‘sexuality for its own sake or promotes or portrays deviation from the identity corresponding to one’s birth sex, gender reassignment, or homosexuality.’ Apart from the less controversial censorship of pornography for under-18s, the law entirely censors transgenderism and homosexuality, in an attempt to protect, as Orbán put it, children from ‘inappropriate influence.’
As expected, international organisations, such as the UN and Amnesty International, condemned Hungary for rolling back LGBTQ+ rights. Whilst indicating a further swing from western values, and the cementing of Orbán’s conservative ideology, there are more tangible effects. Walk into a Budapest bookstore for example, and you will find books depicting LGBTQ+ characters wrapped in protective cellophane. It is now forbidden to mention content relating to homosexuality in sex education classes (which are already hardly taught). Certain shows can only be broadcast in later hours to minimise exposure to under-18s.
Since last Tuesday, the Pride march is forbidden, and participants are subject to up to a 420 GBP fine – almost half the average monthly wage in Hungary. Indicating a greater lean into becoming a ‘surveillance society,’ the government is using a face-recognising system that will identify participants to minimise the possibility of escaping a fine. A subtle nod perhaps to methods applied by the CCP – one of Hungary’s biggest foreign investors. Some of my friends who are members of the community plan on attending with clothing that distorts their identity for the face recognition system. Others have no fear of the consequences of attending Pride.
Since last week, Pride organisers in Budapest have spoken up, claiming that this is not child protection, but fascism. Supporters of the bordering capital city Vienna have shown their solidarity and disagreement in the context of a protest. And of course, many protests have taken place in Budapest.
In its youth the Fidesz party was a liberal, anti-communist party founded right before the fall of the Iron Curtain. Quickly, it shifted towards centre-right liberalism, and during the 15 consecutive years that Viktor Orbán has been in office, it has cemented itself as a right-wing nationalist party. Simultaneously, Hungary has transformed from a democracy to a hardly even illiberal society. More so, the political structure facilitated by Fidesz has started to exhibit signs of autocracy which cannot be ignored.
According to the independent Central European Media and Press Foundation’s research, 78% of Hungarian public media are openly Fidesz supporters. Accordingly, opposition voices are labelling the Hungarian media a propaganda machine which only promotes a government-friendly agenda.
Hungary has been ranked the most corrupt country in the EU for the third consecutive year. Following a legal dispute with the government in 2019, the Hungarian university CEU, founded by long-time political enemy of Orbán, George Soros, was forced to exit the country. As a US-funded university, the forced exit of CEU signals the targeting of independent academia and liberal education. Conveniently, Orbán’s best friend, gas-fitter Lőrinc Mészáros, suddenly became one of the richest people in the country, with businesses across agriculture and media. Corruption continued through the appointment of Orbán’s son-in-law to an influential position. Orbán has manufactured a political climate in which there are scarce numbers of viable substitutes proposed by the opposition.
Now, for perhaps the first time in the Fidesz-era, a prominent alternative has presented itself in Péter Magyar (whose surname fittingly means ‘Hungarian’). Leader and creator of the Tisza party – standing for Respect (Tisztelet) and Freedom (Szabadság) – Magyar has brought mainstream attention to Fidesz corruption. Whilst previous opposition parties have done this already, Magyar goes beyond precedent, both addressing the problem and offering a solution that polls suggest Hungarians trust.
He entered the public sphere as a political voice as the ex-husband of the recently fired Minister of Justice. Appearing on (one of the few) independent media platforms as a former member of Fidesz, he expressed criticism of Orbán’s party. From then on, his political career skyrocketed, and now poses a serious threat to Fidesz. It is up for debate what his initial success should be attributed to - somewhere in between targeting voters who continue to be disenchanted from Fidesz and being consistent, securing unprecedented opposition popularity. He stands for all that Fidesz does not: anti-corruption, transparency, and democratic institutions.
Fidesz has regularly appointed an enemy to position themselves against, allowing them to pose as the better option. In the past this has been “Brussels”, George Soros, liberal elites, and now Péter Magyar. Unlike Orbán, Magyar has gone beyond identifying ‘what’s wrong with the government’ and built a voice exceeding the mere comparison of Fidesz and Tisza. He is building a party whose agenda does not lie on Fidesz’s mistakes.
Although the jewel of the Hungarian opposition emerged from nothing to the next best option in a matter of months, it is undecided whether Magyar will manage to solidify his one-man show into a political party people will vote for in 2026. On March 12th, the independent Medián published a popularity vote showing a clear 9% advantage in popularity amongst Hungarian voters, also presenting an outcome of 56% of people wanting a change of government. Tisza needs to maintain this lead until the April 2026 GE. In other words, Fidesz has reason to worry.
Apart from its similarity to the 2015 Russian extreme bill to illegalise non-traditional sexual relations from public display, Orbán’s CPL move is primarily a political manoeuvre intending to blindside the opposition. It would not be a stretch to assume that Fidesz’s banning of Pride is an effort to shake voter confidence in Magyar. Known as creating a wedge issue, Orbán is forcing the opposition to take a definitive stance on what is interpreted as a complex identity issue, whilst counting on the conservatism of many Hungarians to sway away from Tisza. He aims to kill two birds with one stone. One is to further unbalance democratic pillars like free speech and the other is to depict himself as the saviour and protector of one of the most basic Hungarian values: traditional family-centeredness.