The door to the European Union (EU) may look open, but Britain cannot expect the same deal twice. Though Andy Burnham is looking towards Brussels, the cost of rejoining may prove too high.
Burnham’s efforts to strengthen economic cooperation with EU leaders may bear fruit, but significant obstacles remain to Britain’s return. The question is not simply whether closer ties would benefit the UK, but whether Britain is ready to rejoin on terms Brussels would accept. Although closer integration could support Burnham’s emphasis on domestic welfare investment, membership would inevitably require compromises. Britain should therefore prioritise rebuilding its economic relationship with the EU without rejoining as the ultimate objective.
A return to membership would involve lengthy negotiations and potentially another referendum. Britain would also need to convince Brussels that rejoining would not end in another withdrawal. Alternatively, Switzerland offers a halfway house. It has secured access to programmes including Erasmus, the electricity market and research initiatives in exchange for closer alignment and financial contributions exceeding £320 million. A similar arrangement could bring Britain closer to the EU, without full membership, although Brussels may not offer equivalent terms.
Britain could also join Norway and Liechtenstein in the European Economic Area, gaining single-market access while accepting EU rules and free movement. However, this would cross Starmer’s core red lines, giving Nigel Farage fresh ammunition on immigration. Meanwhile, discussions between Canada and Brussels have raised the prospect of associate membership. Though its terms remain uncertain, a bespoke arrangement could offer Britain closer economic ties without reopening every contentious issue of Brexit.
Whether Brussels would offer Britain such flexibility remains unclear. Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, has welcomed the prospect of Britain’s return but warned against expecting its previous terms. As he explained, the available options, from a customs union to single-market participation, each carry a price in sovereignty and the obligation to follow rules Britain would have limited power to shape. Closer ties, therefore, would not come without trade-offs.
Burnham must also consider the domestic political consequences. Supporting rejoining could help Labour regain voters lost to the Green Party, but the prospect of free movement would leave it vulnerable to Reform UK’s anti-immigration rhetoric. Yet with 57% of Britons reportedly believing Brexit was a mistake, public opinion may offer greater scope for reconsidering the relationship. The challenge is translating that sentiment into support for a specific arrangement.
Burnham’s rhetoric has reopened a debate that raises more questions than it answers. What terms would Brussels demand? How much sovereignty would Britain surrender? And could Labour defend closer integration without reigniting divisions over immigration and border control?
These are not minor details to be settled later; they are the very questions that made Brexit so divisive. Britain must not assume that closer ties will come on its own terms. With Brussels holding many of the negotiating cards, the benefits of integration may come at the cost of concessions that Britain is unwilling to make. Burnham should therefore prioritise closer economic cooperation without rushing towards rejoining, particularly if doing so risks provoking a backlash from Reform UK and undermining public support for closer ties.
His rhetoric may signal a wider shift in Britain’s relationship with Europe. However, until he explains how closer ties would work in practice, his proposals remain an invitation to debate rather than a blueprint for government. Britain may be looking towards Europe again, but whether it is prepared to pay the political price is another question.