The Demise of HS2, One Year On
In what was widely regarded as one of the most tone-deaf conference speeches of all time, last year Prime Minister Sunak took to the lectern to announce the cancellation of the final leg of HS2, the high-speed train connecting London, Birmingham, and Manchester. Once-grand visions of a French-style rail network were consigned to the dustbin of history, which already brimmed with failed regional projects like the Northern Powerhouse and ‘Levelling Up.’ They were joined by the London-Leeds branch of HS2 in late 2021, when an imperilled Johnson government cited COVID-induced fiscal constraints as the first nail in the coffin. The second was the legacy left by the disastrous premiership of Liz Truss, though naturally her successor neglected to say so before the conference hall – not far from which, queues formed to hear Truss herself speak.
A year on, the first Labour budget in fourteen years marked the perfect point at which to depart from the short-termism of the Sunak government and renew the potential of HS2. However the Autumn Budget failed to confirm any extension of the remaining line between Birmingham and London Euston. For the North, HS2 is extinct.
First proposed under Gordon Brown in 2009 and re-energised under the Coalition, HS2 never professed to be a total end to regional inequality in itself. But the UK needs significant rearrangement of its economic activity if the North is to close the development ‘gap’ in other areas where it drags behind the South – or more accurately, behind London. Today, a GCSE candidate in London is 10.6% more likely to achieve a Grade 7 or above than those in the North East or Yorkshire and the Humber, and 10.1% of pupils in the North East are considered at a ‘long-term disadvantage,’ having been on Free School Meals for more than 80% of their education. This is double the national average, and quadruple that of Outer London.
And this isn’t the first time. Have some sympathy for Michael Hestletine, for whom the death of HS2 will bring back memories of his pleas for Thatcher to invest in the North or face mass impoverishment of its cities - a plea he repeated in 2012, to similarly deaf ears. And while not the ‘silver bullet’ to end regional inequality, HS2 had promised an estimated £15bn p/y in northern productivity gains - rectifying a disparity which drains the whole country. The UK’s ‘productivity problem’ will not be solved by a hike in train fares on the West Coast Main Line, or the £2.17bn cancellation bill passed on to the taxpayer.
Even on top of that, a crueller fatality remains: what Hestletine lacked and HS2 coveted was over a decade of hard-earned consensus. Heseltine foundered on the opposition of the Treasury and Cabinet, as well as Thatcher herself, and so the necessary forces never aligned and his petitions fell on deaf ears. But before Johnson got his hands on it, HS2 saw off six different governments and a wealth of inter-governmental opposition, enjoying ministerial and cross-party consensus so rarely bestowed upon regional development plans like Hesletine’s. ‘Levelling Up,’ The Northern Powerhouse, Regional Development Agencies – numerous projects past have fallen victim to governmental churn, a constantly revolving door of policy which sees institutions fail to embed and policy initiatives founder on changing national agendas. As an outlier, was it inevitable that HS2 joined this list?
Regardless of the answer, the whole country will suffer the consequences, though ironically, some hope remains for the South. The Chancellor conceded in the Autumn Budget that HS2 would reach Euston, a fact previously cast into doubt by funding shortages. This then, is the legacy of HS2: an ambitious infrastructure project designed for the benefit of the North was built from the South northwards, so its remnants will serve only to extend the inequality gap it professed to close.