US suspends aid in Gabon: Coups are on the rise in Africa, but what should be done?
On the 24th October, the US suspended aid to Gabon. The state department formally recognised the coup that had taken control of the West African country in August, which under US law requires an end to non-humanitarian aid.
The coup was prompted by claims of corruption in Gabon’s August elections. It is the most recent country in Africa to have undergone a political overthrow, following a string of coups in Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad, and Niger. All of these have taken place in the space of four years since Sudan’s coup in April of 2019. It is a rise which suggests that reversals of democracy and violent uprisings are again becoming the norm in African states, resulting in prolonged political and economic instability.
Why are coups on the rise?
Every coup has its own, complicated origins. But disillusionment with electoral processes has been the primary justification put forward by overthrowers, and this disillusionment is widespread. A report by pollster Afrobarometer offers some illuminating statistics: across 18 countries, only 4 in 10 Africans (42%) believe that their elections “work well to ensure that representatives of Parliament reflect the view of voters”; in 11 countries surveyed since 2008/2009, “the belief that elections enable voters to remove leaders has dropped by 11 percentage points, from 56% to 45%”.
As well as this, nine African leaders have managed to hold power for more than 20 years, by making amendments to legal constitutions that extend their terms. In Equatorial Guinea, ruling President Teodoro Obiang has been in power since a military coup in 1979, making him the longest-serving president of any country. The Gabon coup overthrew the Bongo family following 56 years of their governance - a governance that did little to help the people of Gabon. While the country has the fourth highest GDP per head in sub-Saharan Africa, rates of unemployment and poverty are high. In 2022, nine of Mr Omar Bongo’s (Gabon’s second president, who governed for 42 years until his death in 2009) 54 children were charged with financial crimes. Combine democratic disillusionment with such economic insecurity and you have some of the key motivations behind a coup.
Importantly, the aforementioned statistics do not point to anti-democratic sentiment amongst Africans. Rather, they show that many Africans are not in support of how their so-called democracies are currently run. For many, democracy needs to be redefined to deal with the challenges of corruption, economic mismanagement, and injustice that their countries face. Such sentiments are conveyed clearly in the words of Macky Sall (Senegal’s president since 2012), who has played a leading role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). When asked how future uprisings can be deterred, Mr Sall stated “It is difficult, I don’t know…Sometimes we get lost”. He then questioned if “democracy as we want to do it [is] really suitable”.
What can be done?
Once a coup is in motion, military leaders should use their transitions to proactively improve the political and economic futures of their country. This is not easily done. April of 2023 marked two years of transition in Chad since its 2021 coup, and there are few signs of a serious return to constitutional order - dozens of citizens were killed in protests in October of 2022.
In contrast, Gabon’s Transition Charter offers some hope. It lays out a plan for reform that emphasises democratic ideals, human rights, and open governance. However, it fails to mention the transitional president Gen Brice Oligui Nguema’s eligibility for the next elections, as well as the duration of the transition period. The next national dialogue scheduled to take place in April will be crucial.
A review of the majoritarian model of democracy is also needed. Given the numerous ethnic and religious groups that make up any African country, it is difficult to transition to a democratic rule that works for all citizens. A bottom-up approach through citizens’ assemblies and referendums is likely to be more successful, as minority groups have direct input into policy making.
Finally, it is extremely important to review how much other countries should intervene in such transitions to democracy. On the one hand, increased problems with terrorism in the Sahel region have become a common catalyst for violence and uprisings, and many would like to see more support from the UN and other international forces. More than 10,000 people have died in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger at the hands of jihadists in the past year alone, and each of these countries has undergone a coup in recent years. Mr Sall has stated that “all of West Africa, all of Africa in general, is going to pay a high price” if the international stage turns a blind eye to this terrorism.
On the other hand, interventionist approaches can be a hindrance. Since 2020, seven out of eight successful coups in Africa have been in Francophone countries. Perhaps this is not a coincidence, but rather a consequence of France’s more interventionist approach to former colonies - it keeps a military base in Gabon, for instance. And there are more examples. Britain’s asylum scheme in Rwanda means it is unlikely to criticise its president, Paul Kagame. America’s push for a “peaceful resolution” following Niger’s coup in July of this year meant that ECOWAS was unable to intervene through force to reinstate Mohamed Bazoum, the ousted president.
Conclusion
We can hope that the upheaval which coups bring about can be avoided, but this is never certain. The consequent lack of a cohesive, central government can easily lead to a cycle of uprisings and instability.
On a positive note, coups do signal the need for a reconsideration of democratic institutions in Africa, regarding both how they are implemented, and to what extent foreign powers should intervene. It is clear to see that change is desired by many, and a reconsideration of strategy is necessary.